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Introduction

Today, marriage is at a crossroads. Across the industrialized world, young
adults are marrying later and increasing numbers may not marry at all. And married
couples, for several decades now, have faced a relatively high probability that their
relationships will terminate in divorce. These changes have affected children as well
as adults. The proportion of children born outside of marriage has grown
dramatically, and children born within marriage face an increased risk of parental
divorce or separation. Moreover, marriage itself has changed in important ways, from
a lifelong institutional union to a companionate relationship, the strength and
duration of which is determined by the individual preferences of the parties. Public
attitudes toward these trends are generally accepting; a majority of Americans in a
recent survey were positive or neutral about couples (including gay couples) living
together and having and raising children outside of marriage.
Interestingly, as traditional marriage has declined, the movement to extend
the right to marry to same-sex couples has acquired substantial momentum and
become an important focus for advocates in the gay and lesbian community. A
number of nations and several American states have legalized same-sex marriage;
others have created an alternate status that confers some or all of the rights and
obligations of marriage. This issue has generated controversy. Those who favor
extending marriage to same-sex couples see marriage as a core social status, access to
which is an essential aspect of full membership in society. Social conservatives who
favor an alternate status – or no status at all – agree that marriage is a core social
institution, but argue that extending access to same-sex couples will irreparably
weaken marriage. At the same time, some gay and lesbian advocates argue that
marriage is a gendered and outmoded institution and that the gay community should
not make the right to marry a key political goal.
Controversy has also surrounded the decline of opposite-sex marriage. Some
commentators have argued that the decline of marriage is a troubling social problem,
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while others see the trend as nothing more than a sign of the growing irrelevance of
an obsolete institution. Some who see a problem view the changes as evidence of
moral decline, while others focus on the relative instability of nonmarital
cohabitation as compared to marriage (and of remarriage as compared to first
marriage). Family stability is associated with a range of benefits to children and
instability with a range of risks. And both the risk of parental breakup and the
number of different family arrangements that children experience as they grow to
adulthood has skyrocketed. Moreover, particularly in the United States, a growing
class divide in marriage and family life may exacerbate socioeconomic disadvantage.
Less educated and lower-income individuals are far more likely to have children
outside of marriage than those who have more education and higher incomes. Indeed,
as Sara McLanahan and Irv Garfinkel suggest in this volume, Murphy Brown, the
target of condemnation by Vice President Quale in the 1980s, is a myth; only very
small percentage of college-educated professional women have children outside of
marriage.
While the association between marriage and relational stability is clear,
whether marriage itself contributes to that stability has been less obvious. It could be
that couples who do not marry have preexisting characteristics that would produce
relational instability whether or not their relationships are formalized through
marriage. And even if marriage plays a causal role in promoting family stability, it is
not obvious how policy makers should respond. Should government actively promote
marriage and marital childbearing? Or should government extend the public benefits
and private rights that now accompany marital status to couples that have not
married?
No consensus has yet emerged about the appropriate legal and policy
response to these important changes in family structure. Policy makers in the United
States, both at the national and state levels, thus far have tended to favor retaining the
traditional pro-marriage approach, offering benefits and privileges to married couples
that are not available to other families. Other marriage promotion policies have been
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favored as well. The 1996 federal welfare-reform legislation that provided incentives
to the states to increase two-parent families and reduce nonmarital childbearing was
based on an underlying marriage-promotion policy. More recently, the George W.
Bush administration launched an initiative designed to support “healthy” marriages
through relationship-skills education and the reduction of tax and benefit “penalties”
that might deter marriage. Many states have also launched their own marriagepromotion initiatives. Outside the United States, however, marriage promotion has
been much more controversial, and policy makers have sometimes rejected laws that
treat marriage more favorably than other family relationships. For example, the
Canadian Parliament has revised both tax and old-age pension laws so that the same
standards apply to married and “common-law” partners. Canada is far from unique.
Several nations have extended some or all of the entitlements available to divorcing
marriage partners to one or more groups of unmarried couples: Some countries have
established an alternate status available to same-sex couples, heterosexual couples, or
both, through registration. Others schemes are conscriptive; the couple’s rights and
obligations at separation are determined retrospectively through fact-based analysis.
For example, New Zealand has extended all of the personal rights and obligations of
marriage to couples who have been “de facto partners” for three years.
This volume, authored by social scientists and family law scholars, explores
alternative policy paths forward at this critical juncture. Debates about marriage and
family policy have often been ideological and political; the volume captures the
complexity of the debates through contributions by authors with widely varying
perspectives. But the book also aims to inform the debates by situating them within
an interdisciplinary framework grounded in social science research. This approach
reflects our belief that, although family policy is – and should be – influenced by
social and political values, it should also be shaped by empirical evidence. Over the
past generation, social scientists have produced a large body of research that has
contributed in important ways to our understanding of family formation and
functioning. Family law and policy informed by this research evidence (some
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produced by contributors to this volume) can more effectively support families in
fulfilling their important functions of caring for children and other dependents.
Empirically grounded analysis also offers a neutral lens that, by enhancing
understanding, may sometimes even produce consensus across ideological divides.
Part I of this volume offers historical background on marriage and its
regulation, as well as demographic and cross-national perspectives on changes in
marriage and in family structure. In chapter 1, legal scholars June Carbone and
Naomi Cahn explore “blue” (liberal, egalitarian) and “red” (traditional, culturally
conservative) patterns of family formation and dissolution to inform and enrich our
understanding of recent trends, including the growing class divide in marriage
behavior in the United States. They identify the cultural and demographic roots of
these divergent patterns and chart their comparative advantages and policy
implications. Sociologist Arland Thornton (Chapter 2) analyzes the impact on family
life in the developing world of “developmental idealism,” namely the Western
European insistence that consent, equality, and freedom are fundamental human
rights. He describes a pattern of resistance, modification, and hybridization across a
range of cultures and offers some predictions as to how these cultural clashes will
develop and be resolved in the future. In Chapter 3, Margaret Brinig, an economist
and legal scholar, describes the economic model of marriage and uses it to explore
changes in the allocation of household labor in marital and nonmarital households.
Using data from several waves of the National Survey of Families and Households,
she charts shifts in household labor patterns and relates them to the economic model
of marriage. Rebecca Probert, a legal historian and legal scholar from the United
Kingdom, in Chapter 4 describes current demographic and legal trends in the United
Kingdom and continental Europe, focusing specifically on cohabitation, marriage,
and divorce. She describes both variation within Europe and the ways in which the
general European pattern differs from that evident in the United States. In Chapter 5,
Katherine Franke, a legal scholar, offers an historical perspective on today’s samesex marriage movement by comparing the experience of African-American freedmen
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who first obtained the right to marry in the immediate post–Civil War era. She asks
why the right to marry, rather than employment rights, educational opportunity, or
political participation, emerged for both groups as the preeminent vehicle for gaining
equality and dignity, and suggests, based on the experience of the freedmen, how
marriage rights can also constrain freedom.
Part II focuses on research by contributors (mostly social scientists) on family
change and the public’s response to that change. Several chapters in this part examine
the impact of marriage and other family forms on adult partners and their children,
illuminating the economic, social, and psychological links between family form and
the well-being of family members. Paul R. Amato (Chapter 6) explores the evolution
of marriage, describing three types of marriage that can be observed in contemporary
society: traditional institutional marriage, companionate marriage, and individualistic
marriage. He then compares the three types and finds companionate marriage to be
associated with greater marital satisfaction and stability than the others. Robert E.
Emery, Erin Horn, and Christopher Beam in Chapter 7 investigate whether the
association between marriage and various health and happiness benefits results from
marital status or from individual characteristics by comparing the marital histories
and experiences with clinical depression of fraternal and identical twins who share
childhood experience and some or all of their genes. They report that their data
support the proposition that the marital benefit is not an artifact of selection. In
Chapter 8, using data from the Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study, a major
longitudinal research project in the United States, Sara McLanahan and Irwin
Garfinkel examine the causes and consequences of increased rates of cohabitation
and nonmarital birth; they also offer policy recommendations, ranging from reduced
incarceration to tax strategies, to increase the likelihood that children will grow up in
stable families and to minimize the harms associated with instability if it cannot be
avoided. Finally, in Chapter 9, Ira Mark Ellman and Sanford L. Braver – a legal
scholar and a psychologist, respectively -- probe public attitudes toward family
change and family obligations. They present survey evidence on public attitudes

6

toward marriage as reflected in decisions about post-separation support and property
division. They report that marriage plays a role in public attitudes toward these
obligations, but not a determinative role.
Part III focuses on important contemporary policy debates, with several
authors probing the legal implications of the recent changes in marriage and family
life. In Chapter 10, Judith Stacey, a sociologist, draws on her ethnographnic research
on families around the world to illustrate that a wide range of relationships can fulfill
the important child-rearing and social support functions of families. She argues that
formal, state-sanctioned marriage inappropriately privileges some families over
others, and proposes abolishing marriage as a legal status. Suzanne B. Goldberg
(Chapter 11) and Carl E. Schneider (Chapter 12), both legal scholars, explore the
debate over extending the right to marry to same-sex couples. Goldberg probes the
arguments advanced by gay advocates for and against making the right to marry a
high political priority. She endorses the view that marriage rights are important for
their tangible benefits and as a powerful statement of social equality. But Goldberg
rejects the contemporary relevance of the claim that allowing access to marriage for
gay couples has the potential to transform marriage, suggesting that modern legal
marriage is already based on equality norms. Schneider describes the declining role
of morality in public discourse about marriage and family and analyzes the
implications of this rhetorical shift on the debate over same-sex marriage. He
considers whether same-sex marriage would serve the classic marital socializing
function for gays and lesbians, as some gay advocates have argued, and how it would
affect that function for heterosexuals. In contrast to Stacey, in Chapter 13, Shahar
Lifshitz, a legal scholar, argues against the abolition of formal marriage (what he
calls the “private-neutral” approach), but also rejects the “public-channeling”
approach that favors continuing to make marriage the only means of formalizing an
intimate relationship. Instead, Lifshitz proposes a “pluralist” approach under which
the state would make available to couples in intimate partnerships a range of legalstatus options. This approach, Lifshitz argues, is the best means of protecting the key
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values of pluralism and autonomy and accommodating the important public and
private interests at stake in designing family-status institutions.
The book concludes with two comments. In Chapter 14, sociologist Andrew
Cherlin summarizes and reflects on the various contributions to this volume. We
follow Cherlin’s comment in Chapter 15 with an analysis of the evidence provided
by the contributors, probing the policy implications and offering some tentative
recommendations.
A generation from now, marriage and childbearing may seem quite different
than they do today. Will marriage be less or more important as a family form? Will
lawmakers have increased or reduced government support for marriage? Will couples
who cannot marry today have gained access to marriage? Will formal marriage
alternatives have expanded? Will some or all of those who do not marry be treated
like those who do marry? The interdisciplinary approach offered by this volume
provides tools to analyze and, hopefully, assist in resolving these policy questions
about marriage at a critical juncture.

1
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Legal Regulation of Twenty-First-Century
Families
Marsha Garrison and Elizabeth Scott

A primary theme of this volume is that recent sweeping changes in marriage and
family life present important challenges for family law. Half a century ago, both law
and deeply entrenched social norms prescribed marriage as the only acceptable
family form. Marriage was exclusively heterosexual, and both marital roles and
entitlements were based on spousal gender. As the various contributors to this
volume have explained, much has changed. Across most of the industrialized world,
the proportion of families based on marriage has declined substantially. Increasingly,
couples choose to live together before marriage or as an alternative to marriage. A
2011 survey found that barely 50 percent of American adults were married – a record
low (Pew 2011). A growing number of children are born to unmarried mothers, who
often live in informal unions with their children’s fathers. As a result of higher
divorce rates and the dissolution of nonmarital families, many more children live in a
succession of households involving a single parent, that parent’s new partner, and,
sometimes, the children of the partner or of the parent and the new partner. Same-sex
couples also form families and raise children today in a way that was uncommon fifty
years ago and, increasingly, these couples have been successful in advocating for
legal recognition of their unions.
Several contributors describe how the institution of marriage itself has
changed dramatically over the past half-century. Differentiated social roles for
husband and wife are no longer prescribed in the way that they once were, and the
law has taken a strong stand in support of gender equality (Goldberg, Chapter 11).
The new equality norm is associated with increasing equality in spousal earnings and
a somewhat more egalitarian apportionment of household work (Brinig, Chapter 3).
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Moreover, the meaning of marriage has evolved from a role-based, “institutional”
model to one based on companionship or, more recently, individual personal
fulfillment (Amato, Chapter 6). Under modern divorce law, spouses have
unprecedented freedom to leave unhappy marriages, and public opinion increasingly
favors such freedom (Schneider, Chapter 12).
Attitudes toward family and familial obligation have also changed. Today,
most adults, particularly young adults, are either neutral or positive toward
nonmarital and same-sex couples, with or without children. For example, in a recent
U.S. poll, a majority of respondents expressed positive or neutral views toward a
diverse range of family arrangements, disapproving only of single women having
children without a partner (Pew 2010). Reflecting this attitude change, many
individuals would be willing to extend “spousal” support and grant a propertydivision entitlement to at least some unmarried partners; marital status played a role
in the thinking of the adult Americans polled by Ellman and Braver (Chapter 9), but
not a determinative role.
This account of family change seems straightforward, but on closer
inspection, the trends are complex in ways that pose important challenges for legal
policy.
First, the general trends mask class-based variation in family-formation
behavior. In the United States, Russia, and most of Western Europe, nonmarital birth
is associated with lower educational attainment and “a pattern of disadvantage”
(Perelli-Harris et al. 2010). This variation is particularly striking in the United States,
where nonmarital birth and marriage behavior are now highly correlated with race
and class, creating the possibility that variation in family-formation norms reinforces
the already large disadvantages of minority status and poverty.
Second, the trend away from marriage masks continuing public support for
marriage. Indeed, as both Cherlin (Chapter 14) and McLanahan and Garfinkel
(Chapter 8) explain, the decline of marriage seems to be attributable, at least in part,
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to the fact that marriage is increasingly idealized as a marker of success. The high
priority advocates for gay and lesbian rights have placed on access to civil marriage
also suggests that marriage remains a core social institution. As Goldberg (Chapter
11) and Franke (Chapter 5) point out, the strong emphasis on this goal is
controversial in the gay and lesbian community, and yet it has absorbed the attention
of many advocates.
A

The Policy Challenges

The various shifts in public opinion and behavior that the contributors to this volume
recount pose important questions for policy makers, questions that continue to
provoke profound disagreement. Some commentators long for a return to traditional
marriage (Blankenhorn 2007), while others have welcomed the decline of what they
view as an outdated institution (Fineman 2001; Polikoff 2008). Representing the
latter group, Stacey (Chapter 10) points to the variety of nonmarital families as
evidence that many family types can satisfy the needs of their adult and child
members. She argues that traditional family law has unfairly privileged marriage by
granting public and private rights based on marital status; the solution, in her view, is
for the state to abolish marriage as a legal category.
On one level, few would disagree with Stacey’s conclusion that the trend
toward family diversity is to be applauded; the trend represents a decline in
stigmatization of and discrimination against nontraditional relationships and families.
A reduction in social prejudice is valuable in its own right. So is the increase in
freedom and autonomy that it supports. Lifschitz (Chapter 13) discusses these
advantages of family diversity, but argues, in contrast to Stacey, that the state can
best support pluralism by making available a variety of family-status options that
supplement marriage instead of replacing it. Cherlin (Chapter 14) also sounds a
cautionary note, pointing out that, because marriage remains an important life goal
for a large segment of the population, it is possible that abolishing marriage would
restrict choice rather than expand it.
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This debate over the desirability of access to marriage as a legal status is also
evident in the literature on same-sex marriage. As Goldberg and Franke observe, the
gay and lesbian community has been divided on the importance of marriage as a
political goal. Some share Stacey’s sense that marriage is a regressive, gendered
institution that harms other families and cannot meet the needs of same-sex couples.
Others see access to marriage as an essential aspect of full membership in society.
The question of how the state can best support diverse, autonomous choices
about family life is not an easy one. It is complicated by two other concerns.
First, cohabitation is, everywhere, less stable than marriage and, as several
contributors to this volume make clear, unstable relationships are associated with a
variety of risks to children. If marriage plays a causal role in promoting stable
relationships and reducing child welfare risks, policy makers should be wary of
adopting legal rules that deter or disadvantage marriage. This issue is particularly
salient where, as in the United States, marriage is strongly associated with race and
class; family law and policy should not further worsen the prospects of children who
are already disadvantaged. Whether marriage offers unique benefits that other
relational forms cannot is also important to the debate over same-sex marriage. If
marriage provides benefits (beyond those conferred by government) that informal
relationships cannot match, then the case for making marriage available to all citizens
is enhanced. At the same time, it is important to recognize that many couples will not
marry and many children will be born into nonmarital families. Thus, a critical policy
issue is how the law can best support the full spectrum of children and their families.
Second, marital status has long served as the basis for a variety of legislative
assumptions about relational expectations and equities. Rules governing spousal
inheritance rights and the division of property and support on divorce, for example,
assume that spouses are an integrated economic unit with understandings and
expectations about the sharing of property and continuing support (Scott & Scott
1998); the law does not make these assumptions about nonmarital cohabitants.
Increased family diversity raises the challenge that formal marriage may no longer
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serve as an accurate marker of expectations and equity. But if this is the case, another
means of accurately and fairly classifying couples – in divorce law, probate law, and
across a wide range of obligations and entitlements – may be needed.
In sum, the decline of formal marriage poses two different challenges to
policy makers. Family law and policy should aim to reduce risks to adult and child
well-being. Legal rules dealing with both public status and private rights should also
seek to accurately classify couples to ensure that relational expectations and equities
are met.
A premise of this interdisciplinary volume is that empirical research on
marriage and family relationships can, and should, inform policy making. Within this
framework, the contributors offer a range of thoughtful views on the future status of
legal marriage and how the law can best support children and adults in nonmarital
families. The views that we offer in this comment are grounded in this empirical
perspective. To preview our conclusions, the social science evidence is persuasive
that stable, low-conflict marriage offers benefits to family members (Amato 2005;
Emery 1999); thus we favor retaining the special status of marriage and argue that its
historic harms can be (and to some extent have been) ameliorated through policies of
gender equality and nondiscriminatory access. But not all marriages are beneficial,
and efforts to promote marriage (or deter divorce) are potentially both ineffective and
harmful. Moreover, many couples will continue to live together in informal unions –
a reality that poses other challenges for lawmakers. On questions about the
conditions under which informal relationships generate rights and obligations, we are
not in agreement. But we are in agreement that the public has an important interest in
ensuring that parents in all families can meet their children’s needs, and we explore
some policies that could further this goal.
A

Does Mar r iage Matter ?

Some commentators have argued that the decline of marriage signals its growing
irrelevance. For example, the American Law Institute (ALI) (which does not favor
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the abolition of marriage) has argued that “the absence of formal marriage may have
little or no bearing on the character of the parties’ domestic relationship and on the
equitable considerations that underlie claims between lawful spouses at the
dissolution of a marriage” (ALI 2002). This and similar claims hint at the possibility
that declining marriage rates and the increase in cohabitation may evidence no more
than a shift in family-formation norms in which informal unions that share all, or
most, of the characteristics of marital relationships are replacing formal marriages.
However, the research evidence does not support the supposition that
marriage and cohabitation typically are equivalent in terms of relational expectations.
First, cohabiting relationships are varied in ways that make classification very
difficult; demographers have identified six or seven different cohabitation “types,”
ranging from a casual affiliation, to a stage in the marriage process, to informal
“common-law” marriage (Heuveline & Timberlake 2004; Kiernan 2001). Although
some cohabiting couples share a marriage-like bond, cohabitation often signals a lack
of readiness for or interest in marriage, not marital intentions. The diversity of
cohabiting relationships also ensures that cohabiting couples have varied
understandings about important aspects of their relationships, including the level of
commitment and economic interdependency (Brown 2000; Sassler & McNally 2004;
Scott 2004). In short, the fact that two people are cohabiting does little to reveal their
understandings and relational expectations (Nock 1995).
In contrast to cohabitation, marriage typically is grounded in a set of clear
expectations, the most important of which are commitment and sharing; these
expectations underlie many legislative classifications. Married couples
overwhelmingly report that they share economic resources and that such sharing is a
product of love, trust, and commitment (Blumstein & Schwartz 1983; Pahl 1989;
Stocks et al. 2010) Cohabitants are much less likely to express commitment toward
or support for their partners (Nock 1995; Stanley 2004); across a wide range of
nations, they are more likely to split expenses instead of pooling their resources
(Hamplova & Le Bourdais 2009; Knudsen & Wærness 2009; Lingstadt et al. 2011;
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Vogler et al. 2006). Indeed, surveyed cohabitants often describe the advantages of
cohabitation as a function of noncommitment (Coast 2009; McRae 1993). These
patterns persist even in Scandinavia (Heimdal & Houseknecht 2003; Lingstadt et al.
2011), where there are few economic incentives to marry and cohabitation is “widely
accepted as a way of living together, even when there are children” (Wiik et al. 2009:
466). That many cohabitants do not view their unions as the equivalent of marriage is
also suggested by the fact that the vast majority of cohabitants also report that they
plan to marry a current or future partner. Even in Sweden, survey data shows that the
majority of cohabitants expect to marry within the next five years (Bernhardt 2004),
and most people still do marry at some point (Andersson & Philipov 2002).
In sum, policy makers cannot assume that cohabitation and marriage are
substitutes, with similar expectations of commitment and sharing. To be sure,
marriage no longer serves as well as it once did as a means of ascertaining
expectations and equities; some cohabiting unions are marriage-like and some
marriages are based on little more than formality. Moreover, in some areas of
regulation – domestic violence comes immediately to mind – marital status is clearly
not an appropriate classification device. In other instances, as we discuss later, a
more nuanced scheme may be required.
B

The Marital Advantage: Correlation or Causation?

As Emery, Horn, and Beam (Chapter 7) explain, formal marriage has long been
associated with a range of benefits to adult partners. Researchers have found that
married individuals typically live longer and healthier lives than their unmarried
counterparts (Wilson & Osborne 2005) and that they do better economically
(Ellwood & Jenks 2004; Grossbard-Schechtman 1993). Marriage is also associated
with advantages for children. First, marriage tends to be far more stable than
cohabitation, and relational instability is associated with financial, physical, and
educational risks during childhood and extending into adulthood (Cherlin 2009;
McLanahan & Beck 2010; McLanahan & Garfinkel, Chapter 8). Growing up in a
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single-parent household is negatively, and significantly, correlated with adult income,
health, and emotional stability (Amato 2005; Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan 2004).
Men and women who experience a single-parent households as children are more
likely, as adults, to experience marital discord and to divorce or separate (Amato &
Cheadle 2005; Hetherington & Elmore 2004). There is also evidence that the
advantages conferred by marital childbearing and rearing extend beyond the specific
benefits associated with residential and economic stability: married fathers appear to
be more involved and spend more time with their children than unmarried fathers; if
parental separation occurs, they see their children more often and pay child support
more regularly (Brown 2004; Carlson et al. 2005; Hofferth & Anderson 2003).
This is not to say that marriage is invariably correlated with benefits. First,
the marital advantage appears to be concentrated in low-conflict relationships. The
continuation of a high-conflict marriage is negatively associated with health and
happiness for both adults and children (Emery 1999). Indeed, longitudinal surveys
show that “parents’ marital unhappiness and discord have a broad negative impact on
virtually every dimension of offspring well-being” (Amato & Booth 1997:219).
Second, remarriage does not seem to confer the same advantage as a first marriage
either for adults (Nock 1999:66–82) or children. Children living in step-families, for
example, tend to score lower on tests of emotional and social well-being than
children living with both parents in intact families (Brown 2004; Hofferth 2006).
Finally, a large portion of the marital advantage is explained by “selection
effects.” As both Cahn and Carbone (Chapter 1) and McLanahan and Garfinkel
(Chapter 8) explain, married couples tend to be older, better educated, and better off
than cohabiting couples. At least in the United States, cohabiting couples also have
more physical, mental health, and substance abuse problems than married couples
(DeKleyn 2005; McLanahan 2004); moreover, a large number (40 percent) of U.S.
unmarried fathers have been incarcerated at some point (McLanahan & Garfinkel).
Thus, to a significant extent, the advantages associated with marriage can be
explained by partner characteristics that precede family formation; indeed, it is
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possible that instead of producing advantages, marriage results from them. A key
question for policy makers is thus whether, and to what extent, marital status itself
affects the well-being of adult partners and their children. If it does not, then the
decline of formal marriage presents no particular cause for concern (although it may
still give rise to classification problems).
A number of the contributors to this volume shed light on this controversial
and important question. First, Emery, Horn, and Beam’s twin study (Chapter 7)
supports the view that marital status matters. The novel design that Emery and his
colleagues employed enabled them to largely eliminate both nature and nurture as
potentially confounding variables for their identical-twin subjects. That marriage was
associated with some advantages (less depression and some differences in general
health) in this research sample provides evidence that marriage itself promotes
partner well-being.
The various contributors who tackled the problem of determining whether
marriage benefits children did not have the advantage of such an optimal sample.
However, they show that marital relationships are more stable than nonmarital
cohabitation even after controlling for a wide range of demographic variables, and
their conclusions on this point have been replicated in numerous other research
reports (Crawford et al. 2011; Osborne et al. 2004; Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan
2004).
The persistence of the marital advantage across national and cultural
boundaries also suggests that it does not derive solely from selection effects. In
Scandinavia, which has the longest experience with cohabitation as a mainstream
family form, demographers continue to find that marital childbearing is associated
with greater childhood stability, smaller risks to youthful and adult well-being, and
lower rates of divorce and nonmarital childbearing among children. For example, in
Sweden, where state policies “tend to view cohabitation as equal to marriage, and
many of the regulations of marriage are applied to cohabiting relationships”
(Heimdahl & Houseknecht 2003:527), cohabiting parents are still more than four
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times as likely as married parents to separate before their first child turns five
(Kiernan 2000). And despite a high level of public assistance to single parents –
assistance that produces a child poverty rate of less than 5 percent – single
parenthood remains a risk factor for children even after controlling for a wide range
of demographic variables (Breivik & Olweus 2006; Garrison 2008b; Weithoft 2003).
Separating advantages produced by marriage from selection effects is
difficult, and a large portion of the marital advantage can be explained by partner
characteristics, economic factors, and other variables; the more that researchers are
able to control for these other explanatory variables, the more the marital advantage
diminishes (Crawford 2011; Emery, Horn, and Beam, Chapter 7). However, the
evidence to date supports the claim that marriage itself potentially generates some
benefits for adults and children.
B

How Is the Marital Advantage Produced?

Why is marriage associated with personal benefits? Could family policies improve
the likelihood of these advantages in nonmarital relationships? Again, some of the
contributors to this volume offer useful data on these important questions.
First, it seems likely that the stability associated with marriage is key. Family
dissolution typically is associated with reductions in both income and parental
attention. It also sets the stage for new relationships. As McLanahan and Garfinkel
(Chapter 8) argue, these transitions are often emotionally disruptive, distracting, and
stressful for both parents and children – and they can undermine familial bonds that
are important to healthy child development. A mother is likely to be less focused on
parenting her children from earlier unions when she is building a relationship with a
new partner – and perhaps with his children and, ultimately, with children born to the
new union. In these circumstances, parents may be less attentive to their children’s
needs at the very time the children themselves are dealing with stressful new family
relationships. Moreover, when either parent finds a new partner or spouse, the child’s
relationship with his nonresidential parent often becomes attenuated – a serious loss
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for many children (Cherlin, Chapter 14). In sum, the instability of relationships in
serial families pose stressful challenges and demanding adjustments for both parents
and children, and it is not surprising that children’s welfare often is negatively
affected.
So, if marital stability is a key source of the marital advantage, how and why
does marriage tend to produce more stable relationships? Most experts have
concluded that the public commitments associated with marriage play an important
role. The decision by a couple to enter formal marriage represents an agreement to
undertake a commitment that involves (relatively) well-defined responsibilities to
one another and to any children the couple may have; the registration of such a
commitment is likely a more secure foundation for a stable union than the tentative
step of cohabiting (Scott 2007). Indeed, as Ellman and Braver point out, often it is
not obvious when cohabitation begins. By contrast, in exchanging marital vows, a
couple “agrees to be subject to a complex set of behavioral expectations defining the
roles of spouse and parent, expectations that will restrict their freedom and guide
their behavior in the relationship” (Scott 2000:1907). Of course, the social norms
regulating marriage and the role expectations attached to marital status are weaker
today in an era of more individualistic marriages and readily available divorce
(Amato, Chapter 6). Nonetheless, these norms and expectations continue to inhibit
opportunities to participate in other sexual relationships and to prescribe behavior
that likely reinforces relational stability, commitment, and mutual interdependency
(Scott 2000).
Cohabitation often does not produce these attitudes. In the Fragile Family
Study described by McLanahan and Garfinkel, “most of the … cohabiting pairs
espouse[d] a strong individualistic ethic … in which personal happiness and
fulfillment hold the highest value” (Edin et al. 2004:1011). The researchers offer two
quotes from cohabitants that “illustrate this ethos particularly well, and describe how
sharply cohabitation differs from marriage”:
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The first tells us, “Most people feel like with their boyfriend or

girlfriend, when they get into an argument they can just leave. Most of them
feel like, OK, when you’re married you can’t just walk away and leave like
that.” The second says, “With me and Victor, we have a commitment. But he
can still decide this is not working for ‘him.’ But if you go as far as getting
married, there you need to know you’re really with the person” (Edin et al.
2004).
Of course, the sense that marriage is a commitment from which spouses “can’t just
walk away” has declined. Many married couples get divorced and, in recent years,
“individualistic” marriage, in which the marriage partners hold views much like those
of the Fragile Family Study cohabitants, have become much more common. Indeed,
Amato (Chapter 6) reports that fully 28.5 percent of American marriages were
individualistic in the year 2000. Unsurprisingly, spouses in individualistic marriages
(both in 1980 and in 2000) were most likely to think that their relationships were in
trouble, to think about divorce, and the least likely to report a high level of happiness
in their relationship.
In sum, the marital advantage appears to stem, in large part, from
commitment, sharing, and the greater stability that these attitudes promote. Despite
the rise of individualistic marriage, these advantages appear to persist, but they are
far weaker today than in earlier generations.
B

Why Has Formal Marriage Declined?

Marriage is a malleable and inclusive institution; it can accommodate individualistic
marriages along with companionate and traditional, institutional marriages. So why
has marriage declined?
One reason seems to be a shift in the meaning of marriage. Cherlin, for
example, has urged that marriage “has evolved from a marker of conformity to a
marker of prestige” (Cherlin 2004:855). Survey and interview data support this
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claim. As one interviewee put it, “Marriage is something you earnY.If [she] graduates
and [I] graduate, you can start working and we can afford [a wedding] and that’s
when you get married. It’s not just cause we have a child and all of a sudden we need
to go out and do it” (Kefalas et al. 2011). Of course, the fact that there has been an
attitudinal shift toward marriage does not explain why this is so.
One set of explanations relies on economic factors. As Brinig (Chapter 3)
explains, Professor Gary Becker’s path-breaking economic model of marriage posits
benefits from marital role specialization; it thus predicts that factors diminishing the
incentive to specialize – for example, a convergence in male and female wages – will
produce diminished gains from marriage and a lower marriage rate (Becker 1981).
Economic models also emphasize the importance of sex ratios; if women are in
relatively short supply, the models predict a higher marriage rate, and if men are in
short supply, they predict a lower marriage rate (Ellwood & Jenks 2004; GrossbardSchectman 1993).
Empirical researchers have charted many of the correlations predicted by
economic theory (Ellwood & Jenks 2004; Smock et al. 2005), and the class divide in
marriage behavior described by contributors to this volume supports the importance
of economic factors as an explanatory variable. College-educated Americans – the
only group whose economic prospects have improved during the past few decades –
have continued to bear children within marital relationships during the same period in
which the nonmarital birth rate has skyrocketed (Cahn and Carbone 2010). The
college-educated group is also the only population sector in which male wages have
not stagnated. Most researchers have thus concluded that the increase in nonmarital
families is, in part, a product of a decline in the availability of good, working-class
jobs for men (Wilson 2002; McLanahan and Garfinkel, Chapter 8). This conclusion
is supported by research finding that many individuals in nonmarital families view
marriage as a union in which husbands are wage earners who can care for their
families.
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The racial divide in marriage behavior in the United States also supports the
importance of economic factors, as Richard Banks explains in his important recent
book (2011). African Americans have the lowest marriage rate of all U.S. ethnic
groups. The gap between male and female earnings is also lower for black Americans
than any other group; indeed, on average, black women earn almost 95 percent of
what black men earn (Banks 2011:42–43). Banks observes that black women face a
shortage of available men at all educational levels and that college-educated black
women face a particularly acute shortage.
Economic factors alone cannot explain the magnitude of the recent decline in
marriage, however. Researchers who measured the impact of changing economic
conditions on the marriage rate in the United States between 1986 and 1997 found
that wage and employment shifts explained only about one third of the decline during
that period (Lichter 2002). Further, the retreat from marriage in the United States also
continued throughout the 1990s, despite dramatic increases in economic growth.
At least as important as an explanation for the decline of marriage are
changing social norms that began with the sexual revolution of the 1960s; because of
these changes, couples can freely choose between marriage and cohabitation without
fear of social sanctions. This was not always true. In the 1950s, and even later,
couples who chose to live together, and particularly to have children together outside
of marriage, could expect to confront disapproval in most communities. Strong social
norms prescribed marriage as the only socially acceptable setting for intimacy and
raising children (Scott, 2000). Not surprisingly, most couples seeking an intimate
relationship chose marriage. These social norms have now been largely abandoned in
the developed world (Thornton, Chapter 1), a shift that has surely contributed to the
increased numbers of nonmarital families – and to the decline in marriage.
The importance of social influence is apparent in the fascinating case of
Quebec, where the marriage rate is about half, and the nonmarital cohabitation rate
about double, that of the other Canadian provinces (Lachapelle 2007; Laplante 2006).
A half-century ago, Quebec’s marriage rate was higher than the Canadian norm (Le
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Bourdais & Marcil-Gratton 1996). Although economic conditions undoubtedly
explain some of this shift – Quebec’s already high unemployment rate rose steeply
during the same period that the marriage rate began to decline sharply – most
demographers have concluded that the more important factor is hostility by
Francophone, predominantly Catholic, Canadians to the conservative attitudes of the
Catholic Church. Evidence for this claim comes from two facts: the Quebecois
marriage rate is much lower than that of neighboring provinces with comparable
unemployment figures, and Francophones have a higher cohabitation rate than
Anglophone Canadians no matter where they live in Canada (Lachappelle 2007).
The case of Quebec is particularly intriguing because non-Catholic,
Anglophone Canadians who live in Quebec also have a higher cohabitation rate than
Anglophones who live in the other provinces (Lachappelle 2007). This could result
from economic factors, or from a “bandwagon effect” in which majority
Francophone sentiment influences minority Anglophone attitudes.
Quebec may be somewhat unusual in that hostility toward marriage rather
than acceptance of cohabitation seems to have driven changes in family formation –
but the dynamic interaction between changing attitudes and behavior is not unusual.
Bandwagon effects generally influence public opinion, and, over time, public
attitudes play an important role in shaping private attitudes and behavior (Coleman
1998; Kuran 1995). Those without strong views on a subject may be swayed by
perceptions about the views and behavior of others, and “[e]ach new person on [an]
… upward bandwagon induces additional people to climb on” (Marsh 1984). In this
way, dramatic attitudinal and behavioral changes can occur in a relatively brief
period. For example, in the early 1960s, 80 percent of the public agreed that “a
couple should stay together” for the sake of the children. By the 1980s, agreement
with this statement had dropped to 50 percent (Axinn & Thornton 2000).
The recent decline in marriage thus can be attributed, at least in part, to a
dynamic process through which more favorable public attitudes toward cohabitation
as an alternative to marriage have encouraged couples to cohabit, which in turn has
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increased the acceptability of cohabitation and influenced more couples to choose
cohabitation over marriage in a self-reinforcing pattern.
A

The Role of Law in Suppor ting Twenty-Fir st-Centur y

Families
So, how should the law respond to the growing diversity of modern families?
As a preliminary matter, it is useful to note the general goals of contemporary
family law and policy and the principles we think should animate the legal regulation
of families in the twenty-first century. The primary goal is to ensure that the needs of
dependent members of society, particularly children, are met. Society has an
important interest in the healthy development of children, who will be the next
generation of adult citizens. Society also has an interest in ensuring that families meet
the needs of their dependent adult members; if families perform these important
functions adequately, the burden on government (and on taxpayers) is reduced. In
regard to adults, public policy should also support and respect personal autonomy
and choice in intimate relationships; it should thus avoid discrimination against
particular types of families and acknowledge the legitimacy of a diverse range of
family types. Finally, the law should protect family members from harm, including
harms associated with detrimental reliance on relational obligations and
commitments.
B

Should the State Eliminate or Expand Access to Legal Marriage?

A key question raised by this book is the future status of legal marriage. In
addressing this issue, we think it important to note that the most prominent argument
against marriage today is different from the concerns that animated marriage critics a
generation ago. Beginning in the 1970s, this earlier generation of opponents
challenged marriage as a hierarchical institution that oppressed and subordinated
women (Fineman 1995; Olson 1983; Olson 1984). Although this critique has not
disappeared, it is not the primary objection of most marriage critics today (Stacey,
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Chapter 10). In part, as Goldberg (Chapter 11) explains, this may be attributable to
law reforms that have systematically abolished differential legal treatment of
husbands and wives.
Today’s hostility to legal marriage is typically grounded in the claim that a
“special” status for marriage is harmful to other families – and that all families
should be treated with the same respect under the law. This critique stems, in part,
from the law’s long-standing exclusion of gays and lesbians from marriage. It also
has roots in traditional family law’s harsh treatment of nonmarital families. Until the
1960s, “illegitimate” children of unmarried mothers were ineligible for a range of
legal benefits (including inheritance rights) enjoyed by children whose parents were
married (Levy v. Louisiana 1968). Cohabiting adults were deemed to be in immoral,
“meretricious” relationships – outside of the law’s protection; in some jurisdictions,
even their contracts were unenforceable (Marvin v. Marvin 1975; Hewitt v. Hewitt
1979). The law thus reflected and reinforced the social stigma attached to nonmarital
relationships and birth. Marriage critics point to this history of discrimination and
urge that any continued differential legal treatment of marital and nonmarital families
undermines the legitimacy of nonmarital families.
Although differences in the legal treatment of marital and nonmarital families
require careful scrutiny and justification, we think the evidence shows that this
critique is misguided. First, in recent years, constitutional and statutory reforms have
abolished overtly discriminatory policies toward nonmarital children and
relationships. Second, public attitudes have changed dramatically, and survey
evidence suggests little or no stigmatization of nonmarital families today (Pew 2010).
Third, as McLanahan and Garfinkel point out (Chapter 8), differential treatment of
marriage results in penalties for married couples as well as benefits – and marriage
also carries obligations as well as rights. Finally, the evidence shows that
cohabitation does not typically entail the same type of sharing and commitment as
marriage; differential treatment of marriage and cohabitation thus often reflects the
different expectations and behaviors of married and unmarried couples.
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Our conclusion that differential treatment of marriage and cohabitation is
warranted does not, of course, apply to same-sex couples who cannot marry. But the
answer, in our view, is to make marriage available to all couples seeking to register
their commitment, not to eliminate marriage. Public attitudes toward marriage are
positive, and a majority of adults continue to marry. At least in the United States,
even those who are unmarried typically express the hope to marry at some point in
their lives.
With the abolition of overtly discriminatory policies toward nonmarital
families and the adoption of policies making marriage available to same-sex couples,
marriage becomes an option that all couples are free to choose. Over time, marriage
critics’ concern that the law’s “special” treatment of marriage harms other families
may diminish in response to legal reforms and to changing social attitudes, just as
concerns about gender hierarchy have faded.
Indeed, today’s positive public attitudes toward marriage may be attributable,
at least in part, to the fact that both marriage and marriage law have evolved to reflect
changing social values. These changes are reflected in the gender-equality reforms
noted earlier, in the availability of no-fault divorce, and (indirectly) in legal changes
ending discrimination against nonmarital families. In this evolution, law and social
norms have interacted in a dynamic process and, we think, this is as it should be. As
Legal marriage must be responsive to changing social values, or it will become a
moribund institution inconsistent with current goals for intimate and family life.
Today, lawmakers are challenged to extend marriage to same-sex couples – a group
that historically has been excluded. Responding positively to this challenge
represents the type of adaptation and evolution through which the institution of
marriage has retained its robustness as a family form.
We thus believe that civil marriage should be opened to same-sex couples and
that it should continue to be available to all couples who want to register their
commitment. As Lifshitz suggests (chapter 13), the state’s nondiscriminatory stance
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and commitment to pluralism could be underscored by offering a menu of status
options in addition to informal cohabitation.
B

Should the State Continue to Grant Benefits and Impose Burdens

Based on Marital Status?
This is a hard question given the importance of avoiding discrimination
toward nonmarital families. Government programs that aim to benefit children
should not (and generally do not) discriminate among families on the basis of marital
status. But spouses receive benefits not available to cohabitants, including inheritance
rights, estate tax advantages, Social Security survivor benefits, and a testimonial
privilege, among others. It is well accepted that this package of benefits (and
obligations) has both tangible and expressive value as a signal of the social
importance of marriage.
We think rules distinguishing marriage from cohabitation, and at least some
of the benefits that accompany the formal status, can be justified on several grounds.
First, as Lifschitz suggests, the special legal status of marriage can be justified as a
quid pro quo for the couple’s agreement to formally undertake marital obligations
such as mutual support and sharing. Although these duties are seldom enforced
during marriage (except occasionally under the necessaries doctrine), they are
embodied in divorce law rules that regulate spousal support and property distribution;
they also underlie many of the classifications that distinguish marriage from
cohabitation (Scott & Scott 1998; Scott 2006).
Second, encouraging committed couples to marry may be desirable to the
extent that marriage reinforces commitment and relational stability. Today, as
McLanahan and Garfinkel point out, some committed couples may be deterred from
marrying because they will lose government benefits.
Third, classification schemes that impose marital status, without consent, on
couples who do not have marital understandings needlessly reduce individual
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autonomy. As we have pointed out, many couples cohabit because cohabitation does
not entail marital obligations (Garrison 2005; Scott 2007). Moreover, under current
law, intimate partners can designate one another as will beneficiaries, enter into
contracts, take joint title to property, and otherwise individualize their expectations.
Finally, marriage performs an important notarial function in that it clearly
signals both a couple’s commitments and expectations. Given the range of cohabiting
relationships, factually distinguishing marriage-like informal unions from casual
affiliations that do not warrant special legal treatment may be difficult and costly;
indeed, differences in the wording of questions have been shown to affect self-reports
of cohabitation status among cohabiting couples and couples with nonmarital
children, and even classification by researchers (Knab 2005). “Common-law”
marriage – which relied on a private marital agreement and public “holding out” as a
married couple instead of a marriage ceremony – has been abolished in most states
precisely because of the difficulty of separating spurious from genuine marital
claims. It is thus desirable for committed couples to formally marry so that their
expectations can be recognized without expensive, time-consuming, and potentially
inaccurate fact finding (Garrison 2008b).
This is not to say that the law should never make some form of relief
available to cohabitants who do not register marital intentions or individualize their
expectations through a contract or other means. The question is when and how. The
rapid rise of cohabitation has produced a wide variety of schemes. Some jurisdictions
grant relief based on the couple’s informal agreement(s) (United States), while others
focus on compensating for disadvantage arising from the relationship (Ireland). A
third group treat unmarried couples as married for some or all purposes, based on one
or more relational facts (e.g., the duration of cohabitation or having a common child)
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Scotland).
The lack of consensus on when and how to grant relief to cohabitants who
have not formalized their relational intentions reflects different balances among
competing policy goals and variation in background factual assumptions. We expect
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that it may be some time before consensus on the right approach emerges. Indeed,
this is an issue on which we are not in agreement ourselves.
Scott favors an approach under which cohabitants would assume marriagelike financial obligations based on the birth of a common child or a period (perhaps
five years) of cohabitation, with the possibility of opting out. In her view, the state’s
interest in promoting family stability and ensuring that parents provide financially for
their children justifies imposing obligations on partners when a couple has a common
child from the law’s current neutral stance toward cohabitants. Optimally, the birth of
a child will motivate the couple to consider making a formal commitment to one
another. Indeed, assigning marital obligations when a couple has a child together may
encourage them to marry, if the reluctance of either was attributable to a desire to
avoid financial responsibility. But even if they do not marry, the birth of a child
should signal to parents that they now have obligations toward one another that they
were free to reject previously. The child’s financial security is likely to be interwoven
with that of both parents, and if they separate, that security is not likely to be
achieved through child support alone. As Ellman and Braver (2011) report, public
opinion now favors imposing partner support obligations on unmarried parents.
Scott also views the imposition of marital obligations on long-term
cohabitants (couples who have lived together five years or more) as justified. In her
view, these couples (a group representing a small percentage of cohabiting couples)
are more likely than other cohabitants to be in marriage-like relationships and may
often have an implicit understanding about financial sharing or support – or the more
sophisticated partner may allow the other to believe that they do. A default rule
creating marital financial obligations after an extended period of cohabitation would
put the burden on the reluctant party to disclose his preference to avoid mutual
obligations and persuade the partner to opt out by contract. This approach would
avoid misunderstandings by vulnerable partners while preserving the freedom of
couples who want to avoid mutual financial obligations (Scott 2006).
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Garrison favors an approach, like that recently adopted in Ireland, which
focuses on disadvantage flowing from the relationship as a basis for relief. In her
view, the evidence fails to support the assumption that either the birth of a child or
relational duration create marital expectations: even in Scandinavia, the birth of a
child is not significantly correlated with the seriousness of a cohabiting relationship
(Wiik et al. 2009), and cohabiting couples are significantly less likely than married
couples to pool resources even after the duration of the relationship, the presence of
children, and other socioeconomic variables are taken into account (Lyngstadt et al.
2011). The imposition of marital status based on relationship duration or parenthood
thus creates serious risks of misclassification and reintroduces all the problems with
fraud and uncertainty that have led states which formerly permitted fact-based,
“common-law” marriage to abandon the doctrine. The fact that cohabitants often fail
to agree about the nature of their relationship enhances these risks. Garrison is
skeptical that the stability and other welfare benefits associated with marriage can be
obtained when a couple fails to make formal, public commitments. And she fears that
schemes which impose marital status retrospectively without such formal
commitments may accelerate nonmarital parenting both through bandwagon effects
and by signaling that formal marriage does not matter. Given that targeted legislation
focused directly on remedying relationship-induced disadvantage can prevent unjust
enrichment, she sees no reason to risk such negative effects (Garrison 2005, 2007,
2008a, 2008b).
Although we have not reached consensus on how the state should regulate
nonmarital cohabitants who have not registered their intentions, we agree that the
state should encourage couples with marital intentions to formally marry. We also
agree that the state should facilitate marriage by providing an efficient, inexpensive
registration process and streamlining the process through which individuals’ legal
status is changed.
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B

Should the State Promote Marriage?

If it makes sense to support the registration of marital intentions, should the
government also promote formal marriage?
In recent years, marriage advocates have urged a diverse array of marriagepromotion initiatives (Blankenhorn 2007; Waite & Gallagher 2000). Some focus on
divorce reform while others promote public education. Some proposals aim to
increase the marriage rate either through direct incentives or the elimination of
marriage “penalties” like those described by McLanahan and Garfinkel. Advocates
have also advanced initiatives that aim to reduce marital conflict or reduce
nonmarital births, particularly among teenage mothers. Although these initiatives
have not attracted much attention outside the United States, the George W. Bush
administration funded a number of marriage-promotion programs, and state
governments have funded others.
In our view, the evidence does not support governmental efforts to advance
marriage per se. Because only low-conflict, enduring relationships offer significant
benefits to adult partners and their children, only programs or reforms aimed at
promoting this narrow category of marriages are justifiable. Those that aim to
encourage marriage more broadly should be resisted. Indeed, for high-conflict
relationships, the data suggest that government policy should aim to discourage
marriage and facilitate divorce (Amato 2005; Emery 1999).
Several marriage-promotion initiatives – including divorce reform, marriage
“incentives,” and public information campaigns extolling the benefits of marriage –
clearly fail this test. The revival of fault grounds and other restrictions on access to
divorce have the potential to enhance and prolong marital stress in high-conflict
relationships. Moreover, the problem of spousal collusion – a fact of life that played
an important role in legal reforms eliminating the necessity of establishing fault as a
precondition to divorce – also greatly undermines the ability of courts to separate
marriages worth preserving from those that should be terminated; spouses who agree
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can evade the formal requirements, and the law is powerless to prevent them from
doing so. Marriage incentives are a bad idea for similar reasons. Incentive programs
that encourage marriage per se are not calibrated to foster enduring, low-conflict
partnerships. This problem is particularly acute if incentives are targeted at poor
people, who have the lowest marriage rate. Low-income unmarried mothers often
report that they have not married their children’s fathers because of serious
relationship problems such as violence, addiction, criminal misbehavior, and chronic
conflict (Edin & Kefalas 2007), problems that are strongly associated with both
relationship failure and poor outcomes for children (Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan
2004). There is no reason to encourage marriage in the context of such relationships.
Even public information campaigns that extol the benefits of marriage sweep too
broadly; it is far from clear how government could deliver a pro-marriage message
without promoting undesirable marriages as well as healthy ones. The opinion-poll
evidence also suggests that education about the benefits of marriage is not needed.
These surveys find positive attitudes about marriage and widespread appreciation of
its benefits.
Some marriage-promotion strategies do have appropriate goals. For example,
conflict reduction and relationship skills programs, also included in the Bush
administration’s Healthy Marriage Initiative, aim at promoting relational stability and
quality. These programs, and similar projects aimed at encouraging parental
cooperation before and after separation, may benefit participants. Programs seeking
to reduce teenage pregnancy (almost invariably nonmarital) and to encourage young
women to postpone childbearing until they have completed their educations are also
appropriate and potentially among the most beneficial initiatives. By providing
counseling and access to contraceptives, these programs may assist in reducing the
substantial social costs of adolescent childbearing—for mothers, children and
society.
It is notable that these initiatives with appropriate goals do not entail marriage
promotion per se. Instead, they focus directly on problems with which the decline of
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marriage is associated. In our view, this is the approach that policy makers should
follow, although further research is needed to evaluate the efficacy of particular
programs.
Equally desirable, in our view, are programs that focus directly on the
disadvantages with which nonmarital birth and relational failure are correlated. The
research described by contributors to this volume indicates that many forms of
disadvantage – economic, educational, and psychological – are correlated with
increased risk of nonmarital childbearing, unsuccessful partnering, and deficiencies
in parenting that undermine child well-being. The data also suggest that the
underlying stresses which promote relational dysfunction and instability also
contribute to other, arguably far more serious, deficits in family functioning. Single
and adolescent parenting, substance abuse, mental health problems, adult family
violence, child maltreatment, lack of social support, and low socioeconomic status
are all highly correlated (Garrison 2008b; Huston 2003). In short, relational
dysfunction and instability are often symptoms, as well as causes, of emotional and
economic stresses that should be addressed directly.
Government policies that reduce the disadvantages associated with poverty
thus offer the possibility of providing a range of benefits to children and their parents
(Currie 2006). For example, high-quality, intensive preschool education is
significantly associated not only with long-term educational and social advantages to
the children who attend such programs, but also with a lower rate of child
maltreatment and teen pregnancy within the educated group (Garfinkel &
McLanahan, Chapter 8). These programs also free parents to seek employment and
thus increase their family’s economic well-being. In our view, such programs should
play a central role in any government policy aimed at reducing family instability.
Programs that focus on improving the job prospects of adults who lack a
college education are also important. As we have seen, this is the group that has
experienced the most family instability and the most economic stress. Reversing this
negative economic trend could play a valuable role in reversing the trend toward
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family instability as well ensuring that families’ basic economic needs are met. In the
United States, changes in sentencing policy could also play a valuable role. As
McLanahan and Garfinkel point out (Chapter 8), the extraordinarily high
incarceration rate of young black men not only disrupts their lives and prospects of
productive employment, but reduces the likelihood that they will become responsible
parents and husbands.
Many factors contribute to the challenges faced by unmarried parents and
their children – and government cannot solve every problem. But the relatively
greater stability of nonmarital families in Europe, particularly in Scandinavia, where
nonmarital birth rates are as high as or higher than those in the United States,
suggests that government policies aimed at ensuring that families can adequately
provide for their children – educationally, emotionally, and economically – will
promote family stability and child well-being in a range of dimensions.
We are also persuaded by McLanahan and Garfinkel that, for the most part,
programs available to all children will best advance the welfare of children in
nonmarital families. Some services should, of course, target those most in need. But
eligibility for programs that support parents and children should not be contingent on
nonmarital status; a clear lesson of the research, in our view, is that discouraging
parents from marrying is counterproductive as a policy matter. Beyond this,
programs for which all children and families are eligible are likely to enjoy broader
public and political support. The experience with the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act – a federal law creating an entitlement to special education services
for children – demonstrates that middle-class families constitute a powerful interest
group in support of social and educational programs (Pasachoff 2011).
A

Conclusion

As lawmakers consider how to respond to family change at this critical juncture, we
think that the evidence supports some policy directions: Although fewer couples
choose to marry, marriage continues to be an important goal for many individuals
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and to offer social and personal benefits; thus, we favor retaining marriage as a
special legal status, but one that is available to all couples ready to undertake marital
commitment. We also favor a pluralistic regime that respects the freedom of adults to
make choices about their intimate relationships and which generally is not inclined to
impose nonconsensual marital obligations on cohabitants. Although children in
nonmarital families are disadvantaged relative to children in marital families in ways
that are likely to increase in the future without intervention, neither high-conflict
marriage nor remarriage to a new partner is associated with benefits to children; we
thus do not support initiatives to promote marriage per se. Instead, we favor policy
reforms directed toward supporting the growing number of fragile families – and all
families. Educational, employment and public health programs that contribute to the
ability of unmarried parents to raise their children in a stable, nurturing family setting
will benefit these families and the rest of society as well.
A
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